The purpose of this study is to investigate the extent of voluntary disclosures between 2006 and 2009 that transcends major regulatory and governance changes in Malaysia and to assess the association between strength of corporate governance structure, and ownership structure on the extent of voluntary disclosures of Malaysian listed firms over that period. The average level of voluntary disclosure within the annual reports of sample firms increased over the two periods. Further, the extent of voluntary disclosure is significantly positively associated with strength of corporate governance structure in both 2006 and 2009. Firms with concentrated ownership structure are associated with more extensive voluntary disclosures. These findings highlight the importance of an effective governance regime and concentrated ownership structure in reducing information asymmetry and agency costs and thereby enhancing the level of voluntary disclosures. These findings also have practical implications for policy-makers, analysts, auditors and regulators in Malaysia as well as East Asian countries.
Introduction
In an increasingly volatile global market economy, investors require enhanced corporate disclosures that can assist them to make more informed decisions. Sound corporate governance and improved disclosure are important for the corporate world. The objectives of this study are to determine the variation in the extent of the voluntary disclosure practices in the annual reports of Malaysian listed firms between 2006 and 2009 that transcends major regulatory and governance changes in Malaysia and to assess the relation between strength of corporate governance structure, and ownership structure on the extent of voluntary disclosures in those years.
The current economic climate presents an enormous challenge for the corporate world to commit to sustainable business practices and position themselves as business leaders to their competitive advantage. The last decade has witnessed unprecedented global regulatory pressures for change, worldwide force of corporate governance reform and international convergence of accounting standards; which provide greater impetus for disclosure change. Sophisticated investors require disclosures that go beyond minimum statutory requirement to help them make more informed economic decisions. Non-financial information disclosure of a voluntary nature is a significant concern in developing countries with emerging markets such as Malaysia where the development and sustainability of capital market relies heavily on reducing the information gap between management and investors. Malaysia is one of the countries in the South East Asia region that has experienced rapid growth in market capitalization. The key ingredients in the value proposition of the significant growth in the Malaysian capital market are investor"s confidence and trust in the reliability, quality and timely of information disclosed. Thus, the study on the assessment of the disclosure behaviour on this market is likely to be insightful to a range of stakeholders.
This It is expected that there is a greater focus on continuous improvement to corporate governance practices to improve accountability and transparency through the release of corporate information in annual reports. The MCCG was reviewed in 2007 to strengthen corporate governance practices, in particular with the view to enhance the quality and effectiveness of the board and audit committee. Thus, the 2009 year is selected to represent the further adjustment to corporate governance practices and the IFRS alignment before the full IFRS convergence in year 2012. These two years selected are justifiable in view of the changing governance and accounting landscape in the midst of 2007 global economic crisis could possibly result in changing disclosure practices of Malaysian listed firms.
The study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it evaluates voluntary disclosure practices over two key time periods when Asian and global economic upheavals have triggered higher interest in corporate governance issues to improve transparency and accountability. This study provides an opportunity to clearly examine the pattern of voluntary disclosure practices of matched samples over two periods. Second, this study utilizes a novel and objective measure of strength of governance structure based on the best practice recommendations and principles released by the Malaysian Securities Commission as reflective of better or stronger governance. Currently, there is a lack of research that examines the association between the strength of governance structure and disclosure practices of firms. Reporting practices in Malaysia have evolved in line with changes in governance initiatives in Malaysia and also as a consequence of external shocks relating to economic crises and corporate collapses. Thus, it is important to gain an understanding of the key motivating factors and methods in the international context linking governance structure and management"s disclosure incentives and practices. Finally, our findings should be of interest to economists, analysts, regulatory bodies, shareholders, creditors and accounting professionals. The findings will be of significance to Malaysian regulators and policy makers in assessing the disclosure practices and deliberating appropriate corporate governance requirement to improve corporate transparency. If these regulatory bodies and policy makers are well informed about actual practices at the corporate level, they will be better able to direct their policymaking and regulatory efforts. In view of the near similar governance structure, the findings will also be beneficial to the regulators and policymakers from East Asian countries.
The empirical results of this study reveal that the strength of corporate governance structure is positively significantly associated with the extent of voluntary disclosures. Corporate governance structure plays an important role in influencing voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed firms. Regression results also show a significantly positive association between the concentrated ownership structure and extent of voluntary disclosure in both periods. The findings support the notion that dominant shareholders" assist in monitoring management thereby providing the impetus to communicate greater information in annual reports.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews literature to develop hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research approach. The key findings of the study are highlighted in Section 4 then followed by concluding remarks in Section 5.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Agency theory provides an ideal framework to assess firms" voluntary disclosure practices. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as arising when there is a contract designed to motivate a rational agent to act on behalf of a principal when the agent"s interests would otherwise conflict with those of the principal. In the context of the firm, the agents such as board of directors and managers act on behalf of the principals such as shareholders and debtholders (Godfrey et al., 2006) . The separation of company ownership and management provides management with the incentive to pursue self-serving utilitymaximising behaviour at the expense of shareholders interests. Management are selfmotivated and the goals of the shareholders and management conflict due to the non-alignment of their interests thus, giving rise to agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989) .
In the context of a firm, the crux of the matter is the possible information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. In the agency relationship, managers who have better access to firm"s accounting and financial information can use their discretion in financial reporting to ameliorate agency problem and enhance the value of shareholders investments. Thus, the underlying economic and welfare considerations determine the disclosure patterns within annual reports (Godfrey et al. 2006 ). Extant literature (Ostberg, 2006; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Welker, 1995) cites agency theory to explain managerial disclosure decision making. Management"s disclosure decisions affect firms" credibility with investors and other stakeholders (Mercer, 2005 Beeks and Brown (2006) examine the link between the quality of a firm"s corporate governance and the degree of informativeness of disclosed information. Their findings reveal that better-governed firms make more price-sensitive disclosure, have a larger analyst following, less biased analyst forecasts and more timely valuerelevant information. Overall, Beekes and Brown (2006) provide evidence that better-governed firms make more informative disclosure to the market. Byard et al. (2006) examine the association between corporate governance and the quality of information using a sample of analysts" forecasts. They find that better-governed firms have better quality information environment. Specifically, there is a statistically significant positive association between board independence and analysts" forecast accuracy, and significantly negatively associated with role duality. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) document that the likelihood of making management earnings forecast, a proxy for voluntary financial disclosure practices, is positively associated with stronger corporate governance structure in the form of more outside directors on the board, a lower level of managerial share ownership, a higher level of institutional ownership and a smaller audit committee.
The aforementioned literature suggests the adoption of corporate governance structure is an important determinant in influencing management to make greater disclosure of information on voluntary basis. Following Taylor et al. (2008) , this study constructs a composite governance index based on various characteristics of corporate governance structure enlisted in the MCCG. This approach allows the evaluation of the influence of firm"s governance structure as a whole on the extent of voluntary disclosure. The MCCG sets out principles and best practices on structures and processes that firms may use in operations towards achieving the optimal governance framework. The MCCG is embedded with the transparency and disclosure initiatives; which suggests that firms with effective governance structure are likely to provide extensive information to stakeholders. The enactment of corporate governance principles should contribute to the reduction of information asymmetries between the board and suppliers of capital. Extant literature has shown that the presence of governance mechanisms enhances corporate disclosures (Bassett et al., 2007; Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006) . Thus, it is reasonable to expect that a stronger governance structure will be associated with a greater extent of voluntary disclosures. As market mechanisms for promoting good corporate governance develop, the enhancement of this relationship is expected to develop over time. To formally test the influence of a firm"s overall corporate governance score on the extent of voluntary disclosure, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1: All else being equal, a firm's corporate governance score is positively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure.
Ownership structure is a related aspect of corporate governance and arguably, has its own influencing effect upon voluntary disclosure. Jensen and Meckling (1976) postulate that ownership structure has the potential of reducing information asymmetries and thereby, alleviating agency conflict between shareholders and managers. The degree of ownership structure measures the power of shareholders to influence managers which in turn determines the nature of the agency problem (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) . High dispersion of ownership occurs when the majority of shareholding is held by a large number of individual shareholders. Agency theory argues that firms will disclose more information to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry in a diffused ownership environment (Jensen and Meckling 1976) . A wide shareholder base is predicted to demand more information to be disclosed in the annual reports to reduce information asymmetry (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . Thus, discretionary disclosure in annual reports is likely to be greater in widely held firms so that individual shareholders can effectively monitor that their economic interests are optimised and managers can signal that they act in the best interests of the owners.
Greater disclosure in firms with diffuse ownership is empirically documented. For instance, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find a significant positive relationship between voluntary disclosure of Malaysian firms and ownership diffusion based on the proportion of shares held by top ten shareholders. Using outside equity as a proxy for diffusion in Hong Kong firms, Chau and Gray (2002) reveal that the level of information disclosure is positively associated with wider ownership. The results of these studies of voluntary disclosure behaviour provide support for the agency theory argument that there is a positive association between wider ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure.
On the other hand, the individual shareholders in a diffused ownership structure may lack monitoring capacity due to the low ownership stake of individual shareholders who may not be a formidable force to influence firm"s disclosure choice (Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990) . In this instance, managers may voluntarily disclose less information in the annual reports. This line of argument is empirically supported by Barako et al. (2006) who report a significant negative relationship between ownership diffusion and the extent of voluntary disclosure in Kenya, implying a lack of monitoring capacity due to low ownership stake of individual shareholders.
Notwithstanding the contrary empirical findings, the effect of ownership dispersion on the extent of voluntary disclosure lacks conclusive evidence. For instance, Alsaeed (2005) examines the effect of ownership dispersion on the extent of voluntary disclosure by a sample of non-financial Saudi firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange. His study could not find supportive evidence on the association between ownership dispersion and voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Eng and Mak (2003) use blockholder ownership, defined as the proportion of shares held by substantial shareholders with shareholdings of 5% and more, as a proxy measure of ownership diffusion. They document that the level of disclosure is not significantly related to ownership diffusion (low blockholder ownership). The above previous studies did not support the claim that more monitoring via greater disclosure is required when ownership is diffused.
When ownership is concentrated, the majority of ownership is controlled by a small number of large, dominant shareholders who could play an important role in monitoring management. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large (outside) ownership can help reduce agency conflicts due to their dominant power and incentive to prevent expropriation by insiders. In this regard, the dominant shareholders play a monitoring role and can be expected to put more pressure on management to disclose additional information.
Empirically, Haji (2013) and Ghazali and Weetman (2006) find no significant association between the ownership concentration and the extent of voluntary disclosure of Malaysian listed firms. On the other hand, Hossain et al. (1994) reveal that ownership concentration is statistically negatively related to the level of information voluntarily disclosed by Malaysian listed firms. In contrast, Birt et al. (2006) report that Australian firms having high level of shares owned by top 20 shareholders are more likely to disclose voluntary segment information. They provide the rationale that ownership concentration in the hands of large shareholders has the ability to mitigate the agency problems inherent in a firm by influencing the voluntary disclosures made by the firm.
The aforementioned literature on the influence of the degree of dispersion of ownership on the extent of voluntary disclosure does not reach a clear or consistent finding. The mixed empirical findings of ownership structure as a governance mechanism could be the result of the variations in firms" ownership structure internationally. These differences clearly demonstrate the importance of considering the effect of ownership structure as governance mechanism in influencing a firm"s corporate disclosure practices.
The rapid growth of Malaysia"s economy has not diluted the concentrated ownership structure in Malaysian firms. Zhuang et al. (2001) report that the largest shareholder still possesses an average 30.3% of outstanding shares among all listed firms in Malaysia in 1998, with top five shareholders owning 58.8%. Further, both Abdul Samad (2004) and World Bank (1999) measure ownership concentration in terms of shareholdings by the top five shareholders in Malaysia and document that, on average, the top five shareholders held about 60% of total equity in the corporate sectors. These surveys also document that the predominant shareholdings are held by family shareholders. This suggests that ownership and control of corporations in Malaysia typify the insider-dominated mould with concentrated shareholdings, a feature that is believed to have impaired the effectiveness of existing governance mechanisms in the corporate sector. Given the high insider ownership concentration that characterised the Malaysian firms and the proposition advanced in agency theory, the following hypothesis is put forward:
H2: All else being equal, a firm's concentrated ownership structure is negatively associated with the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Research Methodology
The complete annual report is scrutinized against the disclosure checklist. An item scores 1 if disclosed and 0 if it is not, subject to the applicability of the item concerned. The voluntary disclosure score for each company is additive and unweighted. The unweighted scoring approach assumes that each item of disclosure is equally important (Gray et al., 1995) . Cooke (1989a, p.182) considers that unweighted indices are an appropriate research instrument in disclosure studies when the focus of the research is "directed at all users of corporate annual reports rather than the information needs of any specific user group." On the other hand, the weighted approach incorporates the subjectivity of assigning weights when users" preferences are unknown and likely to assign different weights to similar items (Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987) . A screening process is applied to all selected companies" annual reports to ensure that judgment of relevance is not biased and not penalizing companies for not disclosing an item that is irrelevant. The disclosure instrument is scored and completed by one researcher to ensure consistency of scoring. A firm"s voluntary disclosure index (VDI) is defined as the ratio of actual disclosures to the maximum possible score.
In relation to the measurement of corporate governance variable, the principles and best practices of the MCCG and the Chapter 15 of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement provide authoritative and objective sources for selection of corporate governance attributes. The focus is on the included governance attributes that can be operational and have been deemed in the literature to be relevant. This gives rise to thirteen attributes (as listed in Table 5 ) selected for the construction of a measure of the corporate governance structure of a firm.
Each of the attributes of corporate governance is measured as a dichotomous variable. A value of 1 is assigned for each corporate governance attribute that is presumed to reinforce the voluntary disclosure practice of a firm, and 0 otherwise. A firm receives a score ranging from 0 to 13 depending on the number of attributes satisfied. This approach is deemed to be appropriate in view of the voluntary compliance with best practices of the MCCG. Firms in each period had the "opportunity" to incorporate any or all of these attributes. Given this premise, the corporate governance score are not adjusted as "notapplicable" items. This approach is consistent with Taylor et al. (2008) . The strength of a firm"s corporate governance structure is captured by creating a composite proxy measure, defined as corporate governance score (CGS). The CGS, measured as a percentage, is treated as a continuous variable.
Ownership structure variable is proxied by ownership concentration measured as the top five shareholders. This study includes firm-specific variables such as firm size, leverage, profitability, board size and audit firm size as control variables in the statistical analysis. The firms" annual reports form the basis of sourcing for the data. Table 1 summarises the operationalisation and measurement of the independent and control variables. Natural log of total assets Net profit divided by Shareholders" Equity Total liabilities divided by total assets Number of directors on the board 1 if firms are audited by Big Four, and 0 otherwise To test whether there are significant differences in the extent of voluntary disclosures, the parametric paired sample t-test is conducted. The use of same sample companies over the two periods facilitates the conduct of paired t-test. To assess the effect of each variable on the voluntary disclosure, a normal ordinary least square regression is conducted for each period. The regression model is defined as: VDI jt = β 0 + β 1 CGS jt + β 2 OCON jt + β 3 FSIZE jt + β 4 PROF jt + β 5 LEV jt + β 6 BSIZE jt + β 7 AUDIT jt ε jt where VDI jt =firm"s voluntary disclosure scores β=estimated coefficient for each item or category; CGS jt = corporate governance composite score for firm j in year t OCON jt =ownership concentration for firm j in year t FSIZE jt = firm size for firm j in year t; PROF jt = Profitability for firm j in year t; LEV jt = Leverage for firm j in year t; BSIZE jt = Board Size for firm j in year t; AUDIT jt = Audit firm size for firm j in year t; ε jt = error term Paired t-test is performed to examine the statistical significance of differences between the means of the VDI over the two periods. Table 3 shows there is a statistically significant (at the 1% level) increase in the mean VDI for sample firms. Further insight into firms" implementation of individual corporate governance mechanisms is revealed in Table 5 . There is a notable decrease in firms adopting CG1 from 62% to 53%, a decrease by 14.5%, reflecting the situation that Malaysian firms opt for role duality in latter year. On the other hand, the adoption of the corporate governance attributes increased between 2006 and 2009 are seen in CG6 (increased by 42%), CG9 (26.5%), CG10 (27.3%) and CG12 (28.2%). Generally, Malaysian firms have increasingly become more aware of the adoption of recommended corporate governance attributes particularly the requirements of board subcommittees (audit committee, remuneration committee and nomination committees). Pearson Product-moment correlation coefficients for the continuous explanatory variables as well as the dependent variable for both periods are shown in Table 7 (1980) . Thus, multicollinearity is not a concern in this study. OLS regression results are presented in Table  8 The control variables that are included in this study are firm size, leverage, profitability, board size and audit firm size. Firm size is a very important corporate attribute associated with voluntary disclosure in the annual reports. Table 8 
Results

Tests on Robustness of the Model
A problem encountered in disclosure studies is that disclosure indexes are an empirical proxy for the underlying theoretical construct (Beattie et al., 2004) . Cooke (1998) suggests multiple approaches are helpful to ensure the empirical results are robust across methods. The first approach used as a robustness measure is the rank regression analysis. The rank regression model is estimated with rank transformation of the VDI of the sample companies and four corporate attributes measured on a continuous scale (i.e., corporate governance structure, ownership concentration, firm size, leverage and profitability). The OLS regression test is run on these ranked values plus the auditor type variable measured on categorical scale. The second approach involves transforming actual observations into normal scores using Van der Waerden"s approach (Camfferman and Cooke, 2002, Cooke, 1998) . The VDI and continuous independent variables are transformed into normal scores. This approach offers an advantage whereby a normally distributed dependent variable implies that the errors are also normally distributed by the assumptions of OLS.
Although not reported in this paper, the results of both approaches for both periods support the main findings about the significant influence of the strength of corporate governance structure and concentrated ownership structure on voluntary disclosure practices. The control variables found to have a significant relationship with disclosures are firm size and profitability.
The multivariate analysis undertaken assumes the exogenous determination of both corporate governance and ownership structure variables. Concern arises of the possibility of the endogenous determination of corporate governance and ownership structure. A potential correlated omitted variable problem may occur where there are factors that may potentially affect corporate governance and ownership structure, and that may affect voluntary disclosure of information simultaneously (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) . The endogeneity will adversely bias the OLS model used in this study thus, it would be difficult to interpret the association between corporate governance and ownership structure and voluntary disclosure. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) recommend the examination of the association between changes in level of governance as a way to address potential endogeneity. This approach is appropriate since there is less likely to be a corresponding change in any potential omitted variable that is correlated with both the dependent and independent variables. Hence, the multiple regression analysis is conducted to ascertain the association between the change in voluntary disclosure and the change in the independent and control variables between the two periods. The results (not shown for brevity) indicate that there is no significant association between the change in VDI and the change in CGS and the change in OCON. This change analysis lessens any possible concern of the endogeneity in the determination of corporate governance and ownership structure.
Conclusion
The study examines the association between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance structure and ownership structure. The extent of voluntary disclosure is investigated and compared over two periods when there was a revision to the code of corporate governance and the onset of global economic crisis. These changes are expected to have an influence on the corporate disclosure practices. The empirical results of this study provide credence to previous research findings as well as valuable insights regarding the extent of voluntary information disclosure among listed firms in this emerging country -Malaysia.
The results show that the extent of voluntary disclosures is, on average, low although there is a statistically significant increase over the two years covered in this study. The significant increase could be attributed to the companies" responses to the changes in the business environment as a result of the revised Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance, global economic crisis, mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure requirement and increasing awareness of CSR in the Malaysian environment. Subsequently, the results reveal the extent of CSR information disclosed by Malaysian listed firms increased over the two years. Forward looking and corporate strategy information disclosed have taken a dip while the disclosure on financial and capital market data information remains largely the same over the two periods.
The extent of voluntary disclosures in the annual report is related to a company"s corporate governance structure, ownership structure and firm characteristics. The results suggest that corporate governance structure is positively and statistically significant in determining the extent of voluntary disclosures in 2006 and 2009 periods. Ownership structure is statistically and positively associated with voluntary disclosure in both periods although it is in the opposite direction to our expectation, suggesting that firms with concentrated ownership structure could influence management to voluntarily disclose information. Firm-specific control variables remained significant are firm size and profitability.
The findings offer both theoretical and practical implications. These results provide evidence that firms may voluntarily disclose more information in enhanced governance structure, and imply that when external regulatory bodies emphasize corporate governance, boards align their monitoring objectives accordingly. The strength of corporate governance structure would thus prove to be useful for monitoring board"s activities and mitigating agency-principal conflict which could result in greater communication. The ownership structure as characterized by large, dominant shareholders play an important role in monitoring management and reducing agency conflicts. Thus, the significant increase in the extent of voluntary disclosures in the annual reports by Malaysian listed firms could be considered as the managerial disclosure decision to enhance firms" credibility with stakeholders and thereby, reducing information asymmetry.
In terms of practical implication, the extent of voluntary disclosure as documented in this study should send a signal to Malaysian regulators to strengthen its regulatory framework in encouraging listed firms to disclose information on voluntary basis. In an increasingly volatile and interdependent global economy, both regulators and policy makers play important roles in advocating voluntary disclosures which may demonstrate the potential value of sustainability reporting as a management and investors relations tool. Another important practical implication arises from the study is the involvement of large shareholders in the ownership structure who can serve as good monitors in corporate disclosure decision-making process. Given a relatively similar corporate governance environment, the findings may be of interest to policy makers and regulators in East Asian countries.
This study has its limitations. Although it is not the intention of the study to establish the causality between the corporate governance and ownership structure and voluntary disclosure, the endogeneity issue may be further and deeper investigated by undertaken different methodologies. More governance variables could be incorporated in creating a composite proxy measure -corporate governance score. The dimension of the sample could be increased by analysing more listed firms. Also, the disclosure index can be object of criticism, as the dichotomous measurement can only ascertain the existence of items disclosed and not the informativeness of the disclosed items. Finally, the background and culture of top management team may affect the disclosure policies emanating from the board are excluded from the study. Future research will certainly shed light on these important areas.
